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Abstract 
Greater integration into the international economy is a key means through which countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa can reap the benefits of already existing market opportunities to 
accelerate economic growth and job creation. An effective economic integration strategy requires 
complementing reductions in trade barriers with policy reforms to ensure that markets become more 
competitive (contestable for new entrants) and that operating and transactions costs for firms fall. This 
paper argues that there are two overarching priority areas for trade-related reforms in many Arab 
countries: reducing formal trade barriers further, and lowering trade costs through trade facilitation 
measures and improving “connectivity” for firms, including deeper regional economic integration. 
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Trade and development, Arab economies, economic integration 
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Introduction
*
 
Economic integration, both with neighbors and the world more generally, has proven to be a basic 
feature of all sustained high growth experiences in the post-1950 period. Economies that have grown 
at an average rate of 7 percent or more per year for 25 years or longer all increased their overall 
productivity through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and the acquisition of technology 
and knowledge through education abroad, reverse engineering, spillovers from imports of machinery, 
learning by doing, and exchanges of ideas more generally. These various channels of engagement with 
the global economy allowed firms and households to use already available knowhow and techniques to 
improve living standards.  
All successful experiences of integration had to take their external environment, and in particular 
the external market access conditions they faced, as a given. Successful countries made the most of the 
global economy, despite numerous trade and investment barriers that restricted access to foreign 
markets. Trade policies in major markets helped some countries and constrained others – for example, 
the web of restrictions affecting exports of textiles played a role in jump starting production in some 
countries – but for all the dynamic developing and transition countries what drove export growth was 
the ability to excel at harnessing prevailing trade and investment opportunities. 
Greater integration into the international economy is a key means through which MENA countries 
can reap the benefits of already existing market opportunities to accelerate economic growth and job 
creation. Excluding petroleum exports, the MENA region, with over 400 million people, exports 
roughly the same amount as Switzerland. The potential for improvement is therefore almost unlimited.  
The Arab market itself offers considerable untapped potential for intra-regional trade (Malik and 
Awadallah, 2011; Hoekman and Sekkat, 2010). With a population of over 500 million inhabitants, the 
EU represents a market estimated at 20 percent of global GDP when measured in terms of purchasing 
power parity. Once Turkey and the other new growth poles in Asia, Africa and Latin America are 
taken into account, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and other countries in the MENA region with relatively 
small domestic markets are faced with an almost unlimited external demand.  
A necessary first step to conquer international markets is to open the domestic economy. As is well 
known, a tax on imports is ultimately a tax on exports. The emergence of global value chains and 
international production networks that imply that goods cross borders a number of times before 
reaching the final consumer has rendered obsolete the traditional policy of using trade protection to 
support import-substituting industrial development (Baldwin, 2011). As is true for trade in goods, a 
country cannot become a major services exporter unless it is open to services imports. Opening up 
trade in services, if implemented in conjunction with an appropriate regulatory and competition policy 
environment, can help remedy supply-side constraints and increase productivity of all firms in an 
economy by generating more, better and cheaper services. A country not open to trade in services 
automatically excludes itself not only from a significant part of world services trade, but also 
significantly increases its trade costs to the detriment of its competitiveness and excluding itself from 
participating in global value chains and international production. 
Integrating into global markets is not just a matter of reducing barriers to trade applied at the 
border. The recent experience with trade liberalization in many MENA countries illustrates that an 
effective economic integration strategy requires complementing reductions in trade barriers with 
policy reforms to ensure that markets become more competitive (contestable for new entrants) and that 
operating and transactions costs for firms fall. It is important to recognize that much was done to 
reduce barriers to trade in the MENA region in the last 15-20 years.  Significant progress was made 
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over the last two decades in many Arab countries to lower import tariffs and other explicit trade 
restrictions. Tariffs in Egypt for example were reduced to less than 10 percent on average, down from 
over 40 percent in the late 1980s, most quantitative restrictions removed and the trade regime greatly 
simplified. Similar reforms were implemented in other Mediterranean countries. This stimulated an 
increase in exports of non-traditional products and greater diversification of the export base in a 
number of countries. Many countries also saw an increase in trade in services. Greater inflows of FDI 
were one driver for the increase in trade, especially in the last decade.  
However, the positive supply responses to trade reforms were limited as a result of the continued 
dominant role of the State in most Arab economies (World Bank, 2009). Barriers to entry for new 
firms and high costs of investment in new activities resulting from a plethora of regulatory 
impediments and state control resulted in less job creation and economic dynamism than has been 
observed in other parts of the world following policy reforms to open the economy to foreign goods 
and services.   
Trade Performance 
In 2008, MENA’s share in world exports of nonoil goods and services was only 1.2 percent, up from 1 
percent in 1998 (World Bank, 2011). During that 10 year period, the region’s share in world exports of 
services grew by nearly 30 percent, double that registered by other middle income countries 
(excluding China). The out-performance was offset by under-performance for exports of nonoil goods, 
which registered an increase of only 17 percent, well below the 26 percent attained by the comparator 
group of middle-income economies. Regional export growth was driven mostly by an expansion of 
existing products to new markets and new products to existing markets – that is, along the extensive 
margin (Figure 1).  The dominance of the extensive margin can be explained partly by declining sales 
to a number of traditional export markets in Europe (Brenton, Shui and Walkenhorst, 2010), but is also 
an illustration of a gradual increase in participation in international production sharing arrangements in 
sectors such as motor vehicles (Tunisia) and chemicals (GCC oil exporters). Behar and Freund (2010) 
conclude that a typical MENA country exports less than half and as little as one quarter of its 
potential, controlling for standard determinants of trade such as country size, income and distance to 
partner markets. Similarly, Bhattacharya and Wolder (2010) also find that a typical MENA country 
exports much less than what it should given fundamental trade determinants, although imports are 
much closer to what would be expected.
1
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Figure 1. Non-oil merchandise export growth by region, 1998-2008 (in value terms) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
The major reason for the underperformance is the cost of doing business in the region, part of which 
reflects trade costs. Of course, other factors also play a role. Thus, for some countries real exchange 
rate overvaluation as a result of Dutch disease dynamics impeded greater export dynamism (Diop et 
al., 2012). More generally, however, in many countries trade reforms, while significant in an absolute 
sense, did not go far enough to keep up with what other countries elsewhere in the world were doing in 
removing barriers to trade and lowering trade and other operating costs for firms. Trade potential and 
growth is increasingly determined by the level of the trade costs that affect supply chains. The 
continued prevalence of high ‘red tape’ costs associated with moving goods and services across 
borders in Arab countries – especially in comparison to ‘competing’ countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe – and dominance of the State in the economy limited the positive effects of tariff reduction. 
It is almost a platitude that the structure of the world economy has changed dramatically in the last 
20 years. Products increasingly are produced in regional or global value chains, with value being 
added to a product by firms located in different countries. Much if not most of the value that is 
embedded in products reflects services such as design, marketing and distribution, as well as labor. 
The geographic fragmentation of production is reflected in the increasing vertical specialization of 
trade, with firms in countries producing an input that is exported and used in further processing of a 
product in the importing country, which may then be exported to a third country, and so forth.  It has 
been estimated that some 30 percent of all trade today is vertical in nature (Daudin et al, 2010).  A 
large share of this trade is also intra-firm – involving exchanges between plants that are part of the 
same company. That in turn implies that such trade is closely linked to FDI – and that barriers to FDI 
will constrain the ability of a country to participate in global supply chains. 
A striking feature of the MENA region as a whole is that it participates to only a very limited 
extent in supply chains. The composition of exports varies widely across Arab countries as a result of 
oil. For countries that are importers of oil, exports of manufactured and agricultural goods and services 
accounted for 38 percent of GDP, which is quite high compared to other developing regions. But these 
exports are largely for final consumption – they do not comprise of goods that are processed further in 
the destination market.  
One very crude measure of vertical specialization is intra-industry trade (IIT): imports and exports 
of similar products. Analysts have pointed out for many years that levels of IIT for MENA countries 
are very low (Havrylyshyn and Kunzel, 2000). This has continued to be the case in the recent period. 
IIT was rising during the 2000s, but remains far below what is observed in other regions – indeed, IIT 
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levels are the lowest of any region (Figure 2). Tunisia has been most successful in integrating into 
production networks and has the highest share of IIT in the MENA region (40 percent), followed by 
Morocco and the UAE. The only country in the region with a significant share of components in its 
total exports – a key feature of vertical specialization – is Tunisia, which saw the share of parts and 
components in total exports expand from less than 4 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 2006 (Behar and 
Freund, 2010).  
There are many reasons for the extent to which the region lags behind on this measure of economic 
integration and specialization. In part it is simply a reflection of endowments – oil. But as is illustrated 
by the case of the UAE, natural resource dependence need not imply that there is no scope for 
diversification – the UAE has become a major exporter of distribution, logistics and transport services 
(Ianchovichina, 2011). The main reason for the lack of change in IIT is the level of trade costs in many 
countries. The costs are in part a result of trade policies – e.g., restrictive rules of origin (Gasiorek, 
2008) – but the most important determinant of such costs are administrative procedures and 
requirements: what is often called ‘red tape’.  
Figure 2. Intra-industry Trade Index by Region 
 
Source: Behar and Freund (2010). 
The major reason for lackluster trade and employment performance in comparison with other 
developing countries is an overall lack of competitiveness. Competitiveness is central to harnessing 
private sector growth for sustainable employment, poverty reduction, and, ultimately, wealth creation. 
Firms, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, serving both export and domestic markets 
cannot exploit opportunities if they are burdened by costs outside their control that make them 
uncompetitive. Increasing the number and value of products produced, the number of markets served, 
increasing new investment and the survival rate of firms are all conditional on lowering such costs. 
Following the recent disruptions in economic activity and decline in export revenues, an increase in 
investment is urgently needed. To encourage new entry and expansion of existing firms economy-wide 
policies to improve the business environment and investment climate are needed.  
Priority areas for further reform 
There are arguably two overarching priority areas for trade-related reforms: (a) improve market access 
opportunities and related regulations; and (ii) lower trade costs and improve “connectivity” for firms. 
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Market access in the MENA region is quite restrictive, particularly for exporters from Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan African countries. Notwithstanding the progress made in the last decade in 
reducing tariff rates, the overall level of tariff and nontariff protection in the MENA region vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world remains relatively high by international standards , especially for agricultural 
products (Figure 3). In particular, the region compares unfavorably with its main competitors in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific—
the new dynamic poles of the world economy. 
Significant progress has been made in reducing tariffs on goods in MENA. Over the last decade, 
preferential liberalization under PAFTA and other PTAs has been complemented by reductions in 
MFN tariffs. As a result, the average uniform tariff equivalent of all tariffs (ad valorem and specific) 
for the region fell from some 15 percent to 6 percent between 2002 and 2009. Surveys of trading 
enterprises suggest that tariffs are no longer seen to be a major impediment to trade (Hoekman and 
Zarrouk, 2009). What distinguishes trade policy in a number of MENA countries from other 
developing and emerging markets is the prevalence of nontariff measures (NTMs) and associated 
enforcement and compliance costs. As a result, the overall trade restrictiveness of nonoil exporting 
countries in the region is higher than in most other countries (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Overall Trade Restrictiveness index by region, 2008 
 
Source: World Bank and UNCTAD staff estimates 
Econometric studies suggest that the gap introduced between domestic and world prices for a given 
product as the result of NTMs is typically large in countries for which data are available (e.g., 
Morocco, Tunisia), especially for agricultural goods (Augier et al, 2012). Progress has been made in 
streamlining NTMs over the last two decades, with the virtual abolition of instruments such as 
quantitative restrictions, prohibitions, and price controls and a great increase in the use and incidence 
of technical regulations and product standards. Key remaining hurdles are procedural requirements 
and administrative processes that result in delays and high costs of compliance. 
Tackling costs associated with inefficient trade facilitation and logistics is central to further 
integration of Arab countries, both regionally and globally. The costs of “connectivity” are often fixed, 
and as a result they disproportionately affect small firms, farmers, and the poor, severely limiting their 
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participation in trade and investment. Reducing the costs associated with moving goods along 
international supply chains, whether these costs are measured in terms of time, money, or reliability, is 
a core element of any trade and FDI agenda.  
Based on the results of a survey of trading firms, Hoekman and Zarrouk (2009) conclude that 
tariffs have mostly been removed on intra-PAFTA trade and that customs procedures are now 
perceived to be much less of a problem than in the late 1990s. In 2001, tariffs were ranked as one of 
the most important barriers to intra-regional trade; in 2008 they were ranked last. Instead, transport-
related infrastructure and real trade costs (trade facilitation) were ranked as the most important 
constraints. These results support recent analytical studies that conclude that the magnitude of Arab 
trade flows is significantly lower than it would otherwise because of high real trade costs (e.g., Behar 
and Freund, 2010; Bhattacharya and Wolder, 2010; Harb, 2008; Péridy, 2007; Zaki, 2010, 2011).  
Bourdet and Persson (2011) estimate that improving export and import procedures to the best 
practice level prevailing in the region is likely to increase the value of non-EU Mediterranean exports 
by 34% and to increase the number of products exported by non-EU Mediterranean countries by 21%.  
If exporting non-EU Mediterranean countries reached the level of efficiency in export procedures that 
the best EU countries have, total exports from the countries analyzed would increase by 40 % on 
average. Computations of bilateral trade costs for MENA countries indicate that, as compared to the 
EU, trade costs are typically twice as high in the region, especially for trade between Arab countries 
(Arvis and Shepherd 20112). Maghreb countries have lower trade costs with Europe than between 
themselves (Table 1). Since trade in the Mediterranean region mainly takes place within single 
markets (e.g., EU, GCC) or through preferential arrangements (e.g., Euro-Med Association 
Agreements, PAFTA, Agadir agreement), the cost differentials relate mainly to distance, trade 
logistics, facilitation issues, and the existence of nontariff measures. Trade costs are consistently 
higher for agricultural products. This reflects the higher transportation costs (per unit value) and time 
sensitivity of perishables, but also potentially the impact of more controls at the borders and nontariff 
measures. In short, MENA’s geographic advantages in terms of connectivity to major markets such as 
the EU are more than offset by weaknesses in trade facilitation and logistics. 
Table 1. Bilateral trade costs for industrial products (%) 
 
Maghreb Mashreq GCC Egypt France/Italy/Spain Greece 
Maghreb 95 152 167 126 75 151 
Egypt 126 112 111  119 163 
Mashreq 152 77 96 112 149 185 
France/Italy/Spain 75 149 132 119 50 96 
Greece 151 185 169 163 96  
GCC 167 96 69 111 132 169 
Source: Shepherd (2011). 
The main trade logistics bottlenecks reflect “soft infrastructure” constraints, such as customs and other 
border agencies, trade and transport facilitation frameworks, and trade logistics services providers.
2
 
Container dwell times in Morocco or Tunisia are about a week, which is substantially more than the 
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OECD average (3 days) and also exceeds those of emerging economies in Asia (Malaysia has 4 days, 
and transit time in Shanghai is 2.5 days). Markets for logistics services, including trucking, are 
fragmented by country, with many small providers and few incentives for consolidation and efficiency 
gains. There are relatively few active corridors between MENA countries. Prior to the Arab Spring, 
the most active corridors were Tunisia-Libya, Turkey-Syria-Jordan, and Jordan-Iraq, as well as 
corridors within the GCC. Apart from the Tunisian-Libyan experiment at Raz Jair, there is no cross-
border coordination between countries (a joint border post, for instance), and there is often a wide no 
man’s land between posts, if not an outright border closure. There are typically many controls on each 
side of a border, including for security purposes. 
Countries have much to gain from improving sub-regional trade corridors and regional trade 
facilitation frameworks. In most trade corridors, existing or projected investment in infrastructure will 
not deliver benefits without effective transit systems. The efficient movement of goods and vehicles 
across borders and overland for long distances relies on having in place a seamless transit system at 
the regional level, or at the very least between neighboring countries. While various formal regional 
and bilateral agreements are in place, implementation is often jeopardized by poor cross-country 
cooperation. In larger countries such as Egypt, the performance of internal corridors is also a key 
priority for reducing poverty in lagging areas and addressing rising concerns about development 
disparities within the country. Measures to improve internal logistics performance to improve 
connections to international trade corridors and supply chains is just as important, if not more so, than 
action at the borders. 
A large part of the competitiveness reform agenda revolves around improving the operation of 
markets for services. Trucking services are an example. Informality and relatively short distances 
prevent the emergence of a network of high-quality medium-size transport operators, which has 
implications not only for logistics but also for road safety and urban management. Intermediary 
professions (e.g., brokers, agents) also tend to be very fragmented, with insufficient quality control, 
while nationality requirements for brokers (except in Morocco) favor a small number of well-
connected domestic operators. Yet reforms are possible. In 2007 Jordan implemented an innovative 
loading-by-appointment system at the port of Aqaba, which forced truckers to operate in formal 
companies. This transformed the market structure of trucking operations in the corridor serving 
Amman and Iraq. Morocco has also promoted the development of new logistics services for the 
manufacturing industry, operating in parallel to the “old” fragmented trucking and brokerage sector. 
The reform involved developing logistics zones (e.g., Tangier, Casablanca), opening up the sector to 
FDI, and installing new customs regimes suitable for logistics activities (World Bank, 2012).  
More generally, services trade, whether embedded in goods or stand-alone, represents an important 
source of diversification and growth potential for Arab countries. As already noted services exports 
before 2010 were growing more rapidly than merchandise exports, which often were low-value-added 
industrial goods, confined to the bottom of the productivity chain as emerging countries moved up the 
value ladder. In the past decade the share of services trade in GDP doubled on average, and almost 
tripled in the case of Egypt (World Bank, 2011). Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia rank among the world’s 
30 largest net exporters of services (in value), helping to partially offset merchandise trade deficits. 
However, services exports have been mainly concentrated in transport and travel, that is, tourism. 
Travel alone represents 50 percent or more of the services exports in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and 
close to 50 percent in Tunisia, compared to 25 percent or less, on average, for the rest of the world. 
The share of exports of other types of services, such as business and communications services remains 
well below the world average. 
Barriers to trade and investment in services sectors often are significant in the region (Bottini et al., 
2011). Expanding production and exports of services will often require FDI—and thus liberalization of 
access to services markets for foreign firms. In MENA, FDI started increasing at a rapid pace since 
1995. Indeed, net FDI inflows as a share of GDP were highest in MENA compared to other regions in 
the world (Table 2), illustrating how market reforms, after a time lag of two to three years, can raise 
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the profile of an economy and bring it to the attention of investors, leading to FDI projects, new 
economic activities, and jobs. While the global flows of FDI tripled in the decade preceding the 2008 
global financial crisis, those going to the Arab economies increased at an even higher rate, albeit from 
a very low level. However, except for tourism, FDI outside the energy sector was mostly directed to 
nontradables, with little going to export-oriented manufacturing or high-tech services (World Bank, 
2011). 
Table 2. FDI has grown rapidly in MENA (% of GDP, net inflows) 
 
Source: World Bank, WDI 
The pattern of FDI inflows points to a set of political economy, policy, and regulatory factors that are 
constraining the realization of fully benefiting from globalization. Addressing these issues is within 
the power of national authorities, and doing so could position Arab economies to take greater 
advantage of FDI for economic and social development of both their respective countries and the 
whole region. The manufacturing and services sectors, where most jobs are generated, have not been 
able to attract their shares of FDI, compared to the petroleum and real estate sectors. The limited 
investments received in manufacturing and services have generated little local added value because of 
impediments to spillover effects on the host economy.  
Looking forward, political, social, and legal stability will be a key prerequisite to attract more 
investment, whether of Arab or other origin, and to persuade investors to establish and expand their 
businesses. Equally important, investors need markets and compelling business opportunities to invest 
in those markets. Streamlining current restrictive investment regimes and adopting a timetable for 
phasing out restrictions on foreign equity participation in all economic sectors, except for a short and 
clearly defined negative list would create new opportunities for private investors, especially in critical 
economic sectors such as banking and insurance, electricity, and transport. Opening up to foreign 
investors would entail completion of privatization programs and establishing a level playing field in all 
economic sectors, including improving access to production factors (industrial land, foreign exchange, 
and credit). The payoffs are likely to be considerable. According to the Jordanian authorities, 
privatization and regulatory reforms in the telecommunications sector in the mid-2000s generated 
25,000 additional jobs. Barriers to the process of “creative destruction” in Arab countries are 
enormous. The average firm in the MENA region is almost 10 years older than the average firm in 
East Asia or Eastern Europe. Croatia’s working-age population is comparable in size to Jordan’s, but 
the average number of newly registered firms in Croatia was almost five times higher in 2004–2009 
(World Bank, 2012). 
  
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
EAP 1.57 3.9 2.64 3.46 3.33
ECA .. 1.06 2.16 3.07 4.44
LAC 0.74 1.73 3.93 2.74 3.01
SAS 0.14 0.63 0.72 1.08 3.31
SSA 0.41 1.4 2 2.94 3.47
MIC 0.78 1.97 2.71 2.88 3.51
World 0.99 1.13 4.83 2.55 3.04
MENA 0.22 0.31 1.22 2.57 4.57
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Conclusion 
No country in the last 50 years has sustained high levels of growth and significantly increased per 
capita incomes without greatly expanding trade and investment. Although countries in the MENA 
region made significant progress in the last decade in reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade, the 
regions share in world exports of nonoil products has remained flat. Excluding the oil sector, the 
region remains one of the least integrated in the world, both in terms of intra-regional trade and 
integration into global production networks. Investment has been deterred by relatively high trade and 
investment barriers – while governments did pursue trade reforms, these lagged behind the depth and 
speed of opening of markets observed in other regions of the world. Real trade costs, including the 
impacts of poor trade facilitation and logistics services, remain higher than elsewhere. Intra-regional 
trade agreements among Arab countries and with the EU did not address some of the basic drivers of 
high trade costs and the constraints that impeded investors from establishing or expanding production 
facilities.  
A critical factor that explains the disappointing supply response to reforms implemented in the past 
decade is the lack of growth of the private sector. There are huge opportunities to harness existing 
trade and investment opportunities for growth and employment. The challenge is to establish 
conditions that will encourage entry by new enterprises and expansion of existing firms. As argued by 
Malik and Awadallah (2011) there is an important political dimension to addressing this challenge as a 
precondition is a willingness to accept the associated redistribution of economic rents and influence 
away from the State and entities with close ties to the State (World Bank, 2009). Completing trade and 
investment reforms, including regulatory simplification and reforms of NTMs is an important element 
of allowing such a change to occur, but it is only a part of what is needed to allow a vigorous, 
competitive market place to emerge in countries in the region. 
The importance of deepening economic integration in the MENA region is a core element of the 
diagnostic and the recommendations of a recent World Bank report on trade and FDI prepared for the 
Deauville Partnership (World Bank 2012). The implementation of far-reaching domestic reforms in 
MENA countries is vital to realize the growth and associated employment opportunities offered by 
access to neighboring markets and those in the rest of the world. To confront and adapt to the rapidly 
changing global trade landscape that is driven by specialization and participation in global value 
chains and vertically integrated production networks, MENA countries need to improve their 
competitiveness across the board – including in critical areas such as innovation, business 
sophistication, financial development and overall economic governance. Thus, the policy reform and 
investment agenda goes far beyond the trade cost-related factors that were the main focus of this note. 
But trade integration should figure prominently in future policy-making, including a concerted focus 
on realizing the long-standing vision of greater regional integration of the Arab world.  
  
Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Bernard M. Hoekman 
10 
References 
Arvis, J-F., and B. Shepherd. 2012. “Trade Costs and Facilitation in the Maghreb 2000-2009,” World 
Bank, mimeo. 
Augier, P., O. Cadot, J. Gourdon and M. Malouche, 2011. “Non-tariff measures in the MNA region: 
Improving governance for competitiveness,” mimeo. 
Baldwin, R. 2011. “Trade And Industrialization after Globalization’s 2nd Unbundling: How Building 
and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters,” NBER Working Paper 17716. 
Behar, Alberto and Caroline Freund. 2011. “The Trade Performance of the MENA Region,” MENA 
Working Paper 53, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Bhattacharya, R. and H. Wolde, 2010. “Constraints on Trade in the MENA Region,” IMF Working 
Paper 10/31.  
Bottini, N., M. Marouani and L. Munro. 2011. “Service Sector Restrictiveness and Economic 
Performance: An Estimation for the MENA Region,” The World Economy 34(9): 1652-78. 
Bourdet, Y. and Maria Persson, 2011. “Reaping the Benefits of Deeper Euro-Med Integration Through 
Trade Facilitation,” Lund University Working Paper 15. 
Brenton, P. Shui and P. Walkenhorst (2010) “Globalization and Competition from China and India: 
Policy Responses in the Middle East and North Africa” in Lopez-Calix, Walkenhorst and Diop. 
Chauffour J-P. 2011, “Trade Integration as a Way Forward for the Arab World: A Regional Agenda”, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5581. 
Daudin, G., C. Rifflast and D. Schweisguth, 2011, “Who Produces for Whom in the World 
Economy?” Canadian Journal of Economics, 44(4): 1403–37. 
Diop, N., D. Marotta and J. de Melo (Eds.), 2012. Natural Resource Abundance, Growth and 
Diversification in MENA, Washington DC: World Bank, forthcoming. 
Gasiorek, M. 2008, “The impact of the diagonal cumulation of Rules of origin in the context of Euro-
Med integration,” FEMISE Research Report. 
Harb, G. 2008 “Trade facilitation and intra-Arab trade: an empirical assessment,” Journal of 
International Trade and Diplomacy 2(2): 135-70. 
Havrylyshyn, O., and P. Kunzel, 2000. “Intra-Industry Trade of Arab Countries: An Indicator of 
Potential Competitiveness,” in B. Hoekman and J. Zarrouk (eds.), Catching Up with the 
Competition: Trade Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Hoekman, B. and K. Sekkat. 2010. “Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links,” Journal of World 
Trade 44(6): 1273–1308. 
Hoekman B. and J. Zarrouk, 2009. “Changes in Cross-Border Trade Costs in the PAFTA, 2001—
2008,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 5031. 
Ianchovichina, E., 2011. “MENA’s Non-oil export performance in the last decade,” MENA 
Knowledge and Learning Quick Notes No. 39 (April). At 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/QN39_.pdf. 
Lopez-Calix, J., P. Walkenhorst and N. Diop (Eds.) 2010. Trade Competitiveness of the Middle East 
and North Africa: Policies for Export Diversification, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Malik, A. and B. Awadallah. 2012. “The Economics of the Arab Spring,” Research Paper 79. Oxford 
Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies.  
Harnessing Trade Opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa 
11 
Péridy, N. 2007, “Toward a Pan-Arab free Trade Area: Assessing Trade Potential Effects of the 
Agadir Agreement,” The Developing Economies 18(3), 329-45. 
Shepherd, B. 2011. “Trade Costs in the Maghreb 2000-2009,” mimeo.  
World Bank. 2009. From privilege to competition: unlocking private-led growth in the Middle East 
and North Africa, Washington DC: World Bank.  
World Bank, 2011. Sustaining the Recovery and Looking Beyond (MENA Regional Economic 
Developments and Prospects Report). Washington DC: World Bank. 
World Bank, 2012. From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab World: The Path of Economic 
Integration (Report for the Deauville Partnership in Partnership with the Islamic Development 
Bank). Washington DC: World Bank (Forthcoming). 
Zaki, C. 2010. “Towards an Explicit Modeling of Trade Facilitation in CGE Models: Evidence from 
Egypt,” ERF Working Paper No. 515. 
Zaki, C. 2011. “Assessing the Global Effects of Trade Facilitation: Evidence from the MIRAGE 
Model,” ERF Working Paper No. 659. 
